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This paper is aiming to address the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 
(ASEAN’s) management of intra-regional conﬂ  icts by integrating the study of the 
core-source of its current position, comparing and contrasting the different two 
most signiﬁ  cant periods of its existence: the early Post-Cold War Era and its current 
unveilings, and hedging towards explaining why its barely-enough pragmatism 
is no longer a solvable demeanor for its survival. The paper will focus on the The 
South China Sea conﬂ  ict in the pursuance to explain the distinctions that ASEAN’s 
management of intra-regional conﬂ   icts has gained through experience, through 
realizing its limited containment capacity as far the regional role of great powers 
is concerned, or through a critical removal of passivism in the conﬁ  dence-winning 
processes of extra-regional partners. The paper’s choice to address The South China 
Sea as an intra-regional conﬂ  ict may be surprising for some, or may inﬂ  ate others 
more straightforward as far as the choice for instrumental methods is concerned. In 
order to better explain this paper’s macro-purposes, the South-China Sea conﬂ  ict 
is an intra-regional conﬂ  ict, as the Southeast Asian states involved have divergent 
claims regarding the sovereignty dilemma. Secondly, more interesting issues might 
be brought to the table with the involvement of a great power in an intra-regional 
conﬂ  ict. Last but not least, as connected to the previous argument, ASEAN’s engaging 
and sensitizing of China may generate, from an early start, effects on the perception-
building process between the actors involved.
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1. A SECURITY DYNAMICS 
INVERSION IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN
In the post-Cold War Era, the 
system level is no longer viewed 
as the major catalyst of regional 
order. Hence, the regional systems 
and subsystems have developed 
strategic capabilities to resist 
the primary system’s unilateral 
pressures. More often than not, the 
primary system is not as keen on 
intervening and inﬂ   uencing all the 
regional institutional settlements as 
in the Cold War period. Regions have 
taken advantage of the great power 
retrenchment and have developed 
autonomous regional orders [1].
After the Cold War, a short period 
of time was described in scientiﬁ  c 
literature as: unipolar passivism – 
which is a hegemonic system’s 
unwillingness to control the remotest 
system areas and engage into full 
dominance. It was a new turning point in the ﬁ   eld on International 
Relations, as regional levels were 
trying to ﬁ  ll in the void left out during 
the retrenchment process. Regions 
began to feel more creative in the 
process of distancing themselves 
from the center and in the process 
of undertaking a leadership role in 
regional affairs.  The sub-systems 
began to matter in a way unparalleled 
before: they could generate a self-
reliant security effect for a genuinely 
independent security structure.
For ASEAN, developing a 
regional sub-system, was a much 
hardened task by other extra-regional 
signals, than the system ones. In 
the post-Cold War Era, ASEAN
had ﬁ  nished with the period of its
formative years[2], was celebrating 
its diplomatic achievements during 
the conﬂ   ict period with Vietnam-
led Indochinese states[3]  and was 
just beginning to publicize the ﬁ  rst 
by-products of its regional security 
order. The immediate Post-Cold 
War period found in ASEAN a low-
key international organization, that 
had undergone a process of self-
invention, but that had produced a 
not so thick bunchful of suis-generis 
norms. ASEAN’s raison d’être was 
intra-regional conﬂ  ict  prevention.
At the time of its establishment 
one of the most stringent security 
problems was to protect the new-
founded organization from the great 
power conﬂ  icts in Indochina. After 
the end of the Indochina Wars and 
the destabilizing conﬂ  ict  potential 
eradicated, Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam were granted membership 
status. In the immediate period of 
the Post-Cold War Era, as it was 
entering the phase of its peaceful 
expansion[4], ASEAN’s regional 
management was beginning to 
take contour and shape. A few 
characteristics stand to reason in the 
evaluation procedure of post-Cold
War ASEAN regional management:
A commanding position  x
that ASEAN acquired within 
international fora during its diplomatic 
leveraging inside the United Nations, 
thus shielding the region from the 
great powers’ solutions;
The aspect of a talk-shop x :
ASEAN gathered licit evidence that 
it could soft-bargain intra-regional 
conﬂ  icts and that it could represent a 
launching-pad for regional solutions, 
but was unable at the time to come 
up with more stamina to up-date the 
Southeast Asian sub-system;
An inability to supersede the  x
intra-regional power asymmetries – 
a different distribution of economic, 
military and political power was a 
paramount feature of  Southeast Asia;
An un-sustainable broad  x
theme of a non-intervention in 
domestic affairs;
An unwillingness to address  x
traditional security issues.
Nowadays, a strong, refreshed
ASEAN is not an easy, nor a 
truthful picture to contemplate 
either. A wide spectrum of changes 
in regional dynamics offered many 
unpleasant episodes[5], in which 
ASEAN’s unpreparedness in regional 
management issues patched up with 
the ﬁ   ery episodes it encountered.   
ASEAN’s contemporary intra-
regional conﬂ  ict  management
identiﬁ   es security and defense 
priorities, as well as security 
assessment risks, with the following 
annotations, thus marking a step 
forward from the model utilized in the 
ﬁ  rst years of the Post-Cold War Era:tasking of China’s lack of affability, 
territorial myths, extra-regional 
leverage and regional diplomacy,
the ambivalent neutrality of some 
regional states: the Philippines and 
Vietnam, the over-present unilateral 
responses to China’s balancing acts 
in the South China Sea, ASEAN’s 
departure from the stand-by mode 
and the consequences of such a 
decision.  One of the most recent ones 
happened in June, 2011. The news 
that Vietnam would conduct ﬁ  ve 
live-ﬁ  re exercises in the South China 
Sea on the 15th of June 2011 aroused 
Chinese worries. China views the the 
South China Sea as an appendix of its 
territory. This imperial legacy and its 
persistent effect on current Chinese 
foreign policy behavior  make the 
South China Sea an unstable ﬂ  ash 
point in regional affairs. Therefore, 
it takes little for this kind of foreign 
policy behavior to resurface. 
Vietnam accused China of breaking 
a cable of a seismic surveillance 
vessel. China repudiated Vietnamese 
allegations and, instead, afﬁ  rmed that 
Vietnam played the stalker role and 
chased Chinese ﬁ  shing trawlers. In 
addition to this, Vietnam claims the 
fact that the incident took place at a 
distance of 200 nautical miles away 
from the Vietnamese territory, so it 
took place on Vietnamese territory, 
under international regulations. The 
dispute quickly transformed into a 
show-off of military power. Despite 
the fact that the prospects were 
rather gloomy, the Philippines made 
perfect use of the conﬂ   ict to also 
reassert its territorial claims in South 
China Sea. Both Vietnam and the 
Philippines regard the South China 
Sea as their undisputable area of 
jurisdiction. Particularly interested 
A continuing process of  x
mutual engagement between the parties 
involved in a conﬂ  ict, mainly through 
multilateral dialogue Structures;
The ability to take a more  x
hard-line position, when thought 
necessary; A more hard-line position 
does not transform ASEAN into 
a bully – this new convenience of 
ASEAN management of intra-regional 
conﬂ   icts refers to a role-reversal: 
ASEAN’s aim to preempt conﬂ  icts 
before they happen, or before spiraling, 
through the mediation institution;
ASEAN’s act of maturity  x
in security issues: Promoting an 
ASEAN-wide political and security 
cooperation; ASEAN’s collective 
military presence is not yet a fact in 
Southeast Asia, but it will be in the coming 
years if ASEAN Security Community
will prove resistive to national objections 
made by some regional states who do not 
see this a practical idea;
An ability to recycle the lessons  x
from the past: ASEAN is still a stickler 
for the non-interference norm, but 
not in a frenzied manner, as a partial 
reaction to the escalation of conﬂ  icts in 
the region and as a need to set a part for 
itself in these new evolutions.
In the next section, we will 
be trying to analyze ASEAN’s 
wherewithal in the South China  Sea 
disputes, denoting several aspects 
where the over-strained relationship 
with a claimant state and a Southeast 
Asian extra-regional actor – China- 
involved and is still involving 
powerful bearing situations in which 
hard-choiced need to be made.
2. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
CONFLICT
The South China Sea Conﬂ  ict is 
composed of several allaying concerns 
and analyses regarding the multi-in the Paracel Islands, Vietnam 
accentuated its territorial claim also 
by taking a historical approach. 
Vietnam adamantly refuses to co-
share an area that, from a Vietnamese 
angle, is under Vietnamese rule since 
the ﬁ  fteenth century. This episode – 
chosen because of its rotational effect 
on two of the most concerned regional 
states in the turn of events in the South 
China: Vietnam and Philippines – 
highlights the complexity of the 
conﬂ  ict and the fact that any delay 
of an ASEAN response will squash 
any of its eventual efforts. In the 
following, we will try to present 
the different correspondences to 
ASEAN’s critical steps in delivering 
an area-focused strategy.
2.1. Disseminating the South 
China Sea Dilemma
Reﬂ  ections upon the South China 
Sea have always been mindful of 
considering the host of potential 
territorial conﬂ   icts that may easily 
emerge in a geographical area where 
sovereignty has been loosely deﬁ  ned. 
The South China Sea conﬂ  ict 
represents a very interesting case study 
due to the fact that it was considered 
for a long time an obscure area to 
analyze. Regional processes were 
not well-endowed with institutional 
mechanisms, instability thrived and 
suspicions heightened about the 
main regional actor controlling the 
situation: China. And China was not 
an actor that achieved conspicuously 
little in the Southeast Asian region[6]. 
China was not an arrogant agitator, 
but rather a traditional master of 
the region, aiming to thwart any 
questioning about this auto-imposed 
status-quo. Exchanging views about 
the recent developments in the 
South China Sea is not an easy job, 
especially because exhausting the 
multiple interpretations does not 
come easily at hand. Countering 
China in the South China Sea was 
never a full-size option for the littoral 
states of Southeast Asia, but rather 
a task that exhausted their security 
resources [7]. As the years went by 
and ASEAN’s regionalism began
to blossom and the Southeast Asian 
states emerged as newly and fully 
emancipated units of the regional 
sub-system of Southeast Asia, the 
South China Sea Dilemma appeared.
The South China Sea Dilemma
refers to the turning into a play tub 
of three interconnected dimensions 
of the South China Sea situation: a
sovereignty dilemma, an energy 
dilemma, and a military dilemma. If 
ASEAN wants to continue to shore 
up its diplomatic prowess in the case 
of South China Sea, punctual answers 
need to be found to this perilous 
conjuncture of security derivates of 
the South China Sea situation.   
The Sovereignty Dilemma - A 
self-supporting representation by 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, 
Indonesia and Philippines against 
China’s historical sovereignty claims 
upon most of The South China Sea 
was and is an all-too-rare occurrence 
as the power inequalities became 
even more obvious at the bilateral 
handling level. In its turn, China 
sees any state that interferes with its 
sovereign monopoly as a perpetrator. 
Encouraged by the sensible economic 
effects of the Opening of the Doors,
China ambitiously pursued its 
imperial dream. China wanted to 
display a major comeback from the 
humiliations suffered during the 
nineteenth century and during the Second World War. After solidifying 
their independence and encouraged 
by the fact that Southeast Asia was 
no longer a volatile, bellicose and 
unstable melting pot of major power 
intervention, the regional states of 
Southeast Asia also issued territorial 
claims to some features of the South 
China Sea. The claims differ in size, 
purpose and intentions, but each and 
every one of them is indicative of 
the respective actor’s status in the 
regional architecture, political force 
and threshold regarding its capability 
of reaction to pressures.
The substance of China’s claim 
can be, in a nutshell, explained as the
deﬁ  nition of the South China Sea 
as a Chinese lake. China’s claim to 
the lion’s share of the most important 
maritime hot-spot in East Asia [8] is 
currently exercised over the Paracel 
Islands and 15 features in the Spratly 
Islands. In a map formulated even 
from the Kuonmintang Regime Era 
(1947[9]), The South China Sea was 
sketched out as a maritime portion 
single-handedly pertaining to the 
Chinese territory, under the form of 
a ”U”-shaped line. China’s actual 
claim is, in fact, a mixture of calling 
for the historic right doctrine:
sovereignty by tradition, in which the 
time-factor plays an overwhelming 
role and the continental shelf and 
economic exclusive zone doctrine – 
which can be used, in accordance 
with China’s claims to the features of 
the South China Sea in which China’s 
property rights have not reached 
full-term yet. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982) underlines a very important 
principle which needs to be prompted 
in states’ behavior, mentioned in the 
section referring to the Agreement 
relating to the implementation of 
Part XI of the Convention:
Desiring by this Convention to 
develop the principles embodied 
in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 
December 1970 in which the General 
Assembly of the United Nations 
solemnly declared inter alia that the 
area of the seabed and ocean ﬂ  oor 
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, as 
well as its resources, are the common 
heritage of mankind, the exploration 
and exploitation of which shall be 
carried out for the beneﬁ  t of mankind 
as a whole, irrespective of the 
geographical location of States.[10]
By natural consequence, no state 
in the world will likely concede China 
the right to maneuver the largest 
part of a sea that strategically links 
quintessential commercial maritime 
routes with highly important global 
inter-connections. In a map envoy 
presented to the United Nations 
Comission of the Continental Shelf,
China refers to the ”U”-shaped
line as adjusting to the inclusion of 
the relevant waters. China protested 
when in 2009 Vietnam and Malaysia 
put forth claims to the United Nations 
Comission of the Continental Shelf,
with the aim of extending their 
continental shelf [11]. Due to the 
territorial proximity of the littoral 
states of the South China Sea, a 
precise delimitation of the continental 
shelves of each one of them is a 
pretty difﬁ   cult undertaking, as the 
different claims tend to overlap. The 
question that arises here is how can an 
international law settlement act as a 
panacea for all the actors involved? 
It is very hard to say that the 
role of international regulations is 
overrated or irrelevant in this case. The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982) renders a 
few guidelines to produce less sparks 
in case a maritime conﬂ  ict shall arise: 
The sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an 
archipelagic State, its archipelagic 
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea [...] 
Every State has the right to establish 
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, 
measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention.[12] 
Furthermore, other technical 
recommendations have been made to 
decipher any possible limbos that might 
occur in the implementation process:
(a) For the purposes of this 
Convention, the coastal State shall 
establish the outer edge of the 
continental margin wherever the 
margin extends beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured, by either: (i) a line 
delineated in accordance with 
paragraph 7 by reference to the 
outermost ﬁ   xed points at each of 
which the thickness of sedimentary 
rocks is at least 1 per cent of the 
shortest distance from such point to 
the foot of the continental slope; or   
(ii) a line delineated in accordance 
with paragraph 7 by reference to ﬁ  xed 
points not more than 60 nautical miles 
from the foot of the continental slope; 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the foot of the continental 
slope shall be determined as the point 
of maximum change in the gradient 
at its base. [13]
China’s sense of sovereignty not 
only creates political and regional 
tussle, but also a context for great 
power browbeating. Yes, Southeast 
Asia is a natural, outspoken, unabated 
sphere of inﬂ  uence, as far as China is 
concerned. However, China’s sense 
of entitlement showcased a spiraling 
trajectory, bearing in mind that China 
felt the need to collect as much of 
the perks as it could from the status 
of winning power of the Second 
World War. Numerous actions have 
been made by China to reinforce its 
exorbitant claims – whether through 
the use of the People’s Liberation 
Navy, or through elusive paramilitary 
structures acting to protect its 
maritime interests from the naval 
expansionism of other littoral states. 
Intimidating, harassing, bullying 
have been the buzzwords associated 
to Chinese behavior, the attributions 
being made by the regional states. 
The regional states felt very uneasy 
with the structural changes in Chinese 
foreign policy, signaled ever since 
China occupied the Paracel Islands in 
1974, within a military backlash with 
Vietnam. When tackling sovereignty 
claims, the regime of features in 
The South China Sea can also 
explain the progressive development 
of facts. Depending on the nature 
of the feature claimed – reef, bank,
island, etc. – an exclusive economic 
zone can be attributed to the claimant 
actor, or not.
The sovereignty dilemma 
represents a hard-line issue that ASEAN
is, practically, exposed to and forced to 
contend with. ASEAN’s diplomacy has 
a very limited role to play in this matter. 
ASEAN’s diplomacy’s main focus is 
to create a conducive environment in 
the South China Sea for regional peace 
and prosperity. China’s presence in the 
South China Sea always made sure 
that not a single opportunity was left 
untapped. China’s envisaging of the South 
China Sea lies in the concept of sea 
as a territory – haiyang guotuguan,
outlining China’s unwillingness to 
share. This positional consolidation 
has attracted immediately extra-
regional critics [14]. ASEAN states, 
however great a future fallout with 
China or however imperative the 
shelving of the sovereignty issue 
will prove to be, do not want to 
cloister China in the category of 
other regional actors and, hence 
advocate the settlement of disputes, 
but not at any cost. ASEAN has 
also done very little, almost nothing 
in appeasing the contradictory 
approaches of the ASEAN states 
involved in this dispute [15]. There 
are no patterns available – formally 
or informally converged – that would 
underpin an equitable intervention 
made by ASEAN for a decisive and 
all-embraced ﬁ  nale.  According  to 
the opinion upheld by this paper, 
ASEAN needs to secure much-
needed intra-mural support for intra-
regional intervention. China ratiﬁ  ed 
the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982), but still 
gives steadily away arguments from 
rather obsolete historically-supported 
claims. The reservations under which 
China sealed in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982) topple the core considerations 
under which the document was 
designed to legislate. China thrives 
from the confusion and from the 
sizeable uncertainty the situation 
transmits and is still clogging to it.
The military dilemma -   China’s 
muscle stretching in the South China 
Sea is not the most confrontational 
trait of the military dilemma of the 
South China Sea. The reasons for 
considering that a military dilemma 
adumbrates upon the South China 
Sea conﬂ   ict are compound. A top 
one would represent the embodiment 
of the strident domestic nationalism 
by the People’s Liberation Navy. 
Nationalism is construed by China as 
a means to project in the region inﬂ  ated 
and self-important approaches: the 
self-depiction of China as a big state
and the delineation of the Southeast 
Asian states as small states [16] is 
a patent and indisputable argument 
regarding China’s regional self-
portrait. Through the use of the 
People’s Liberation Navy, China will 
gradually proliferate its sovereignty 
in the South China Sea waters. 
During 2009-2011, certain statements 
made by People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLA/PLAN) ofﬁ  cers  raised 
many eye-brows, while leaving the 
Southeast Asian littoral states in 
dismay. To list just one, Admiral Lin 
Huaqing – the commander of the 
PLAN during the 80s – claimed that 
China will be able to exercise control 
over the ﬁ  rst chain of islands in the 
South China Sea, which correlates 
several important chokepoints in the 
region: the Philippines, Indonesia, 
eventually Singapore and the Malacca 
Strait [17]. Even if the majority of 
the comments were made by ofﬁ  cers 
who are no longer part of the active 
human resources of the PLAN, 
their acknowledgements are not 
overlooked by China’s neighbors.
Another very important feature of 
themilitary dilemma of the the South 
China Sea is the snarling display 
of Chinese military might! New, 
improved military facilities are likely 
to be used by China in the near future 
in the freshly-endowed South Fleet: type 2208 fast track craft for high-
intensity combat in the near seas, the 
new type 056 corvette, the launching 
of the Yunan-class submarine during 
2010, the Yulin military base, pitched 
in with Kilo-class convention 
submarines imported from Russia. 
The major frictions in the South China 
Sea are also attributed to the military 
enrichment program from which the 
military structures in the South China 
Sea and the para-military structures 
beneﬁ   tted. As Chinese experts 
agreed: “a stronger navy would back 
up a ﬁ  rmer claim” [18]. A military 
solution to the the South China Sea 
conﬂ  ict would not be beneﬁ  cial for 
either one of the parties involved. 
Like any great power, China’s main 
focus in foreign policy is to obtain 
geopolitical and economic survival. 
More than anything, China would 
not risk to be dragged into a maritime 
conﬂ   ict in which the United States 
would surely toggle along, especially 
after the launching of the US Trans-
Paciﬁ  c Partnership and after the recent 
compression of US regional ties.
Theenergy dilemma educes from 
the rather dim and smudgy accounts 
of what the seabed of the South China 
Sea is thought to be hiding: a seabed 
rich in minerals, natural gas and oil. 
According to the United States, the 
seabed of the area hides 28 billions 
of barrels of petrol. The Chinese 
statistics amount to 213 billions of 
barrels of petrol in South China Sea. 
The gas reserves in the South China 
Sea seabed are thought to amount to 
2 quadrillion cubic feet. Regardless 
of the accuracy of the numbers 
presented, any claimant part that 
could come into the possession of 
the biggest share of these resources 
can, without question, inﬂ  uence the 
balance of power in Southeast Asia. 
In some estimates, The South China 
Sea is referred to as: the Second
Persian Golf [19]. As far China is 
concerned, the energy issue remains 
a dire issue. Even if China is still able 
to produce for itself 85% of the energy 
it needs, considering the development 
spur of the last few years that China 
witnessed, China’s thirst for energy 
has become an unquenchable thirst. 
Ever since 1993, when China became 
a net oil importer, China has been 
prospecting new ways to reduce its 
oil imports from the Middle East. 
Proﬁ   t-seeking ventures in the 
South China Sea are the mirage 
that enchants especially the oil 
companies. However, until now, the 
disputed areas of the the South China 
Sea have remained, for the most 
part, untapped. The restructuring of 
China’s national oil companies has 
transformed their purpose towards 
proﬁ   t-oriented policies. As state-
owned, but not state-run, China’s oil 
companies have leveraged a strong 
inﬂ  uence upon the central government 
to begin the exploring and drilling 
activities in the disputed areas. Until 
now, this type of activities has not 
been initiated [20]. On the other hand, 
Southeast Asian states have keenly 
addressed the issue of exploring 
unspoiled areas in the South China 
Sea. Disagreements quickly erupted 
between the Southeast Asian states 
that also share in common a claiming 
rivalry. For instance, Malaysia and 
Brunei argued over developing a 
gas ﬁ   eld-project in an area where 
their territorial claims overlap [21]. 
ASEAN does not have an energy 
policy per se – collectively endorsed 
in South China Sea- especially due to 
the territorial dilemma’s implications. This does not obstruct Southeast 
Asian states to individually try to 
oversee the area in order to gain as 
many advantages as they can.
The three dilemmas of the South 
China Sea are strongly intertwined, 
thus, exposing the scarcity of the 
situation, especially from ASEAN’s 
angle. ASEAN faces the luring 
presence of China as an actor and as 
a major component of the Southeast 
Asia conﬂ  ict in three miens – one
regarding sovereignty, the other 
regarding the military proﬁ  le of the 
parties involved and the last one 
regarding energy.
2.2. ASEAN’s absenteeism from 
the regional management
At ﬁ  rst, ASEAN did not provide 
the pacifying degree that the region 
sought for. For lengthy periods of 
time, and especially during the Cold 
War, China was entangled in radical 
domestic policies and was not 
that interested to pursue maritime 
expansionist schemes in Southeast 
Asia. Some cartographic references 
of Chinese maritime ambitions could 
have been perceived in 1936, when 
China for the ﬁ  rst time included in 
an ofﬁ  cial document the South China 
Sea as being Chinese. China’s later 
actions did not unveil the fact that the 
possible spillover of tensions from 
the thronged area of the South China 
could be rendered a fact, as it had in 
other occasions [22]. As time passed 
by, China’s claims used a multiple-
edged rhetoric, using a combination 
of ﬁ   ve important principles: the
principle of the archipelago, the
principle of the historic presence,
the principle of the continental 
shelf, the principle of the exclusive 
economic zone [23]. Meanwhile, 
during most of its formative years 
and during the subsequent periods of 
time,ASEAN’s absenteeism from the 
regional management was tributary 
to other important principles: 
effectively managing the communist 
insurgencies in Southeast Asia,
striving to maintain a region-free 
of great power intervention, aiming
to cement a slender, but important 
normative main-body that will help 
the organization not lose its functional 
and operational capabilities in the 
future. The US – as one of the greatest 
extra-regional actors with the potential 
to build a naval presence in Southeast 
Asia that would not have been left 
unobserved, did not show undiluted 
interest in this region, as it had shown 
in other parts of the globe. 
However, even after ASEAN’s 
institutional emancipation, with the 
breakthrough-moment of the 1976
Declaration, ASEAN did not plunge 
into adopting a more responsible 
strategy towards China’s presence in 
the South China Sea. Only in 1992, 
ASEAN issued The Declaration on 
the South China Sea. The Declaration 
did not include any legal distinctions. 
It was, however, the ﬁ  rst diplomatic 
move that ASEAN would use to try 
to regulate China’s intentions and 
make them more predictable. China 
counter-responded with an anti-
legalistic approach as it was not ready, 
nor eager to be obliged to respect 
binding regulations. ASEAN’s 
informal style of diplomacy and the 
regional elites’ pursuance to keep it 
that way suited China. Furthermore, 
ASEAN was not able to speak in one 
voice. Managing the overlapping 
territorial claims in the South China 
Sea meant managing divergent point 
of views. Pro-China ASEAN states sided with China partly out of fear of 
Western enmeshment with regional 
affairs, partly out of the desire to 
protect domestic security interests 
that took precedence over regional 
ones. Malaysia was in its anti-West 
period. It occupied two reefs in 
the South China Sea and felt that a 
rapprochement with China would 
trigger a reciprocal support from 
China’s part. ASEAN was merely 
beginning to tackle the South China 
Sea as a matter of concern and had not 
taken a tough approach concerning 
the preservation of common interests 
in the area. Feeling let down by 
ASEAN, Philippines signed a Visiting 
Forces Agreement with the United 
States, allowing the US to utilize 
Philippine facilities for training. The 
Philippines used the 1951 Treaty of 
Friendship as a means to reassure 
China and other regional states that 
it will not be left out in any debate 
concerning territorial and sovereignty 
assignment. If China had not been 
involved, the US would have taken 
a more mellow approach. It would 
have still favored the Philippines, 
but it would not have been militarily 
committed.
2.3. Escaping Absenteeism:  
Institutional Re-Inventing, 
Institutional Interlocking and
Socialization in the China-ASEAN
Relationship
When discussing ASEAN’s 
escapism from absenteeism in 
the South China Sea, it is worth 
considering the utilitarian, almost
neutral approach, that the Southeast 
Asian states (and  even U.S.) have 
sometimes applied towards China 
and its role in regional dealings. 
During the afﬂ  ictive Vietnamization 
period of the Vietnam War and after 
the Sino-Soviet rupture, China was 
seen by the U.S. as a lesser evil and 
as a possible mediator. During the 
Third Indochina Conﬂ  ict,  China 
was allowed to invade Vietnam, as a 
punitive measure against its invasion 
of Cambodia. China was seen, in 
this case by ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) states, as 
the tolerated problem-solver, even if 
this view was short-lived. During this 
period, China’s aggression towards 
Vietnam in the South China Sea 
was just a piece of the very instable 
security puzzle in Southeast Asia. 
With other conﬂ  icts  unveiling, 
the Sino-Vietnamese squabbling 
was a small-scale, less signiﬁ  cant 
conﬂ  ict. While Chinese assertiveness 
in the South China Sea heightened, 
it was clear that the conﬂ  ict  no 
longer revolved around a bilateral 
basis. With other regional countries 
being drawn into it by Chinese 
uncompromising posture and with 
ASEAN expanding its membership 
in Indochina, the situation in the 
South China Sea became a regional 
predicament. ASEAN is currently 
taking shy steps to building a regional 
community of security cooperation 
and welfare purposes, verifying all 
the key requirements: an implicit 
interdependence, an embryonic 
version of cognitive regionalism -
a consciously built regional 
identity, the devising of norms and 
mechanisms to solve dispute and 
eventual conﬂ  icts (it is important 
that these norms and mechanisms 
exist, even if their implementation 
is not a productive one in the incipit 
stages). ASEAN’s current meaning 
of security was not circumscribed to 
a non-exclusive dimension. ASEANbegan to embrace a holistic concept 
of security – based on a convivial 
juxtaposition of military, political, 
economic and social factors. The
1967 Declaration states inter alia:
the countries of Southeast Asia 
share a primary responsibility 
for strengthening the economic 
and social stability of the region 
and ensuring their peaceful and 
progressive national development 
and are determined to ensure 
their stability and security from 
external interference in any form or 
manifestation.[24]
The 2003 Bali Concord II 
Declaration announced the objective 
of creating the ASEAN Security 
Community by 2015, in an integrated 
three-pillared construction. The
ASEAN Community Idea does augur 
a generic security identity for the 
Southeast Asian states and a security 
community that has resulted, just 
like the EU, from statist construction 
and just like the EU, is currently 
transcending its statist origins. Just 
like the EU, the ASEAN Community 
Idea is a self-generating process 
in its branding of regionalism and 
in its quest for becoming a security 
community.  ASEAN’s steering of 
Southeast Asian regionalism falls 
into the language of constructivism. 
By employing a constructivist take 
upon Southeast Asia’s regional 
security dynamics, the quality of 
the interstate interactions becomes 
inextricably intertwined with the way 
that the norms are shared between the 
states that take part in the interaction 
process, powerfully illustrating 
the close linkages between global, 
regional and domestic actors. The
2011 Bali Concord III aims at 
enriching ASEAN’s global role 
through coordinating the substantial 
ﬂ  are of the ASEAN plus One,ASEAN
plus Three, ASEAN Regional 
Forum and East Asia Summit
regional processes. According to the 
Declaration, ASEAN has to remain 
the highlight of this batch of regional 
frameworks. Also according to the 
Declaration, ASEAN has to give 
a strengthened and much needed 
capacity to the ASEAN Secretariat. 
In order for the community building 
to occur, ASEAN needs a powerful 
and self-engaged ASEAN Secretariat. 
However, compared to the eurocracy-
type mechanisms that the EU uses, 
the ASEAN Secretariat does not, 
by far, have the same sense of 
accomplishment that the former has. 
Its powers are still loosely deﬁ  ned. 
Another curveball mentioning is that 
ASEAN will create a more legalistic 
ASEAN Security Community, based 
on the rule of law. This observation 
is very important as many ASEAN
governments are regarded by the 
international community to have 
played foul tricks on the domestic 
implementation of the rule of law. 
If legalism is no longer treated as a 
simple aesthetic factor, ASEAN’s
critics will certainly downsize their 
commentaries. Of course, this will be 
a gravity-deﬁ  ant move, as ASEAN’s
glints off informality. Beyond any 
shadow of a doubt, sovereignty, 
independence and non-interference 
were mentioned as headﬁ  rst reference 
points. The improvement of military-
to-military communication and the 
enhancement of civilian-military 
communication were mentioned, 
together with the creation of an 
ASEAN platform on global issues by 
2022. A hissing trajectory towards a 
denser international role of ASEAN is setting in place, as Susilo Yudhoyono 
Bambang said: “great hopes are 
placed on our region”.
The adoption of a Code of 
Conduct for the South China Sea 
would mean a guarantee for a Chinese 
peaceful rise and for the curtailing 
of the Chinese misinterpreted 
spontaneity in its bilateral dealings. 
The idea emerged in 1996 at the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. China 
did not give in during negotiations. 
The concept of a Declaration of a 
Code of Conduct was more value-
based and less compulsory for the 
parties involved. The November 
2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea 
meant that, generally, the situation 
in the South China Sea remained 
unchanged. ASEAN’s facilitative 
role, played so as to obtain China’s 
unquestionable engagement, was 
a celebrated failure. China was not 
engaged multilaterally. There was a 
slight possibility that the Declaration 
could be catalytic for more 
transparency in territorial disputes.
ASEAN has made tremendous 
efforts in ensuring, through 
multilateral and bilateral dialogues, 
which were not conﬁ  ned to an Asian 
membership, the preservation and 
the maintenance of regional peace 
for a period of almost 35 years and 
China’s socialization with ASEAN’s 
normative ensemble. One of the 
most incredible feats of ASEAN
diplomacy is the fact that ASEAN
managed to obtain from China the 
signing of the Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the The South 
China Sea Declaration. After the 
China-ASEAN Summit of November 
2010, China committed itself to work 
with ASEAN for the implementation 
of the Guidelines for the Declaration 
of Conduct in South China Sea.
2.4. Managing China’s 
fragmented actorness 
in the South China Sea
This paper is ostensibly making 
use of the term actorness, referring 
to an actor’s innate prerogative to make 
use of its innermost ideas, interests and 
objectives, in an inter-subjective context.
China’s actorness in the South 
China Sea resembles a kaleidoscope 
composed of different and 
heterogeneous actors. This harmful 
diversity not only produces ill effects 
for China’s lack of celerity when 
implementing authority, but also to 
ASEAN, when trying to assess the 
numerous actors that China has to 
create a rising comfort level between. 
Toils are in store for China 
when addressing the bureaucratic 
management of the South China 
Sea, veiling the fact that China has 
to be able to deal with a few layers 
of instability of its own, and not 
provoked by other regional states. 
The emphatic power of the term: 
nine dragons who are stirring up 
the South China Sea – underlines the 
nature of crowdedness of the South 
China Sea: “realities are changing   
much faster than our politicians, 
diplomats, and lawyers can handle 
them”[25]. Not only is the Chinese 
central authority spread out in 
multiple levels of authority, but other 
different sources of provenience of 
authority can be tracked down. If 
the myth is only complacent to nine 
actors, in reality, in the South China 
Sea, there are 11 central governmental 
agencies, 5 other agencies for law 
reinforcement and plenty of private 
actors [26]. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, even if it is supposed to be 
the general on-looker of the events in 
South China Sea, ﬁ  nds it very hard to meddle into the decisions taken 
by other administrative bodies: ﬁ  rstly, 
because the levels of authority are 
too many and secondly because his 
jurisdiction is not a comprehensive 
one. His jurisdiction is remarkably 
absent from the legal investitures of, 
for example, the Bureau of Fisheries 
Administration. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not at 
legal liberty to impose sanctions upon 
other actors or to institutionally reward 
their loyalty for their homeland. 
Compared to the poor maritime 
presence of the Southeast Asian 
states domestic actors, the coastal 
governments of China’s coast 
provinces are keenly concerned about 
the regional dynamics of the South 
China Sea, as they are key defenders 
of their economic plans. In stark 
comparison to other actors of the 
public sector, the coastal governments 
are resentful of the heavy political, 
thorny guidelines which the central 
government has prescribed for China. 
The governments of Hainan, 
Guandong and Guanxi engage 
as actors in the South China Sea 
conﬂ  ict for the undeniable purpose 
of maximizing an economic situation 
[27]. The powers with which these 
governments are invested emanates 
fromthe principle of decentralization,
unwisely implemented in China. 
The provinces’ governors have the 
same uncut authority that the central 
governments have. Justly or unjustly, 
the local governments seldom escape 
the central control, as their decision-
making process does not have to take 
into account messages distributed 
by the central authorities. Of the 
three local governments, the Hainan 
government, ever since its creation 
as a territorial administrative unit (in 
1988), was handed over the general 
management of the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands and the management 
of the adjacent waters.
For ASEAN, more actors equal 
more worries and more unpredictable 
fuses in powder kegs! In this panoply 
of different actors, for the majority of 
them, their huge number will distort 
the role that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is committed to playing in the 
South China Sea maritime dispute, 
especially as far the coordination 
management is concerned. But this 
is, nevertheless, China’s worry! 
ASEAN’s worry would be how to 
supervise the implementation of the 
policies it proposes, if it is trying to 
make use of the pre-emptive diplomacy 
that proved, over the recent period, to
be successful. The common ground, 
for most of these actors, is the fact 
that they are domestic actors – which 
means, that, in a given situation, they 
will try to pursue their own self-
centered interests, even without a 
head-bowing behavior towards the 
Chinese actors from the ﬁ  rst line of 
command. In the South China Sea 
dispute, ASEAN used as a regulatory 
and cooperation mechanism with 
China the Joint Working Groups.
This type of mechanisms can be used 
when interacting with the relevant 
domestic actors, especially with the 
local governments. Joint Working 
Groups between Chinese provincial 
governments and the provincial 
governments of the Southeast Asian 
coastal states may be instated, for 
collaborative purposes.  If the Joint 
Working Groups proposal is considered 
to be another demultiplication of 
institutional structures, then, during 
the ASEAN-China Summits, a parallel 
structure including the actors afore-mentioned, can be integrated. Given any 
eventuality, the inclusion of these actors 
inASEAN’s approach towards the South 
China Sea conﬂ  ict is unavoidable.
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
PROCRASTINATING THE 
CHALLENGE
OR CHALLENGING 
THE PROCRASTINATION?
Drawing a conclusion from the 
arguments presented, the South China 
Sea is an example of how a regional 
organization was able to convert 
its bone-structure employed as a 
survival tactis in an on-going string 
of changes in the regional dynamics. 
If in the past, ASEAN suffered from 
chronic absenteeism and was unable 
to deliver a viable, regional counter-
response to Beijing’s evolving strategy 
in the South China Sea. ASEAN is 
not ready yet to step up its game in 
the South China Sea, as it has to deal 
with a closer threat perception: that 
of managing the overlapping claims 
of its regional states: the territorial 
claims of the Southeast Asian states 
not only overlap with China’s, but 
also overlap with their other intra-
ASEAN partners. This is a scenario 
that may develop in a variety of 
destabilizing ways. According to 
the opinion presented by this paper, 
the positive turns of the conﬂ  ict 
and, most of all, China’s modest 
compromise to forego joint actions 
with ASEAN in order to formulate 
guidelines for the implementation of 
the South China Sea Declaration of 
Conduct already created a precedent 
in regional affairs! Whether this 
is part of China’s newly-adopted
charm offensive, or if it is only a 
skillful ASEAN exercise of greater 
inﬂ  uence in the region, the shift in 
China’s regional perception has been 
produced, together with numerous 
expanding areas of cooperation. 
As far as the extra-regional 
incumbent balance of power is 
concerned, the interdependence of 
geopolitics, energy and international 
relations delivered in the South China 
Sea triggers three different patterns of 
behavior. U.S.’s lateness to interfere 
in the South China Sea disputes can 
be atoned by gaining ASEAN back-
up. Balancing China, in this case, 
would require U.S. to go beyond 
the protection of its commercial 
interests in the Paciﬁ  c sea lanes just 
like a bishop. Southeast Asian states 
can, self-directedly, promote their 
interests if these interests are to be 
elucidated in a collective manner. 
The geographical juxtaposition 
to Southeast Asia and the South 
China Sea enables China to play 
magniﬁ  cently the role of a rook on 
the maritime chessboard. ASEAN’s
imprecision and lagging smoothens 
China’s castling on the maritime 
chessboard. US can, ultimately, 
be the wise bishop and promote its 
interests by admitting that ASEAN is 
its most efﬁ  cient diagonal leverage!
If China’s socialization, in 
some areas, is certainly deferential 
to ASEAN’s model of conﬂ  ict 
management – which implies a
heavy use of diplomacy – the acute 
lack of harboring other relevant 
Chinese actors in ASEAN’s strategic 
calculations (especially Chinese 
domestic actors!) is both a challenge 
and an opportunity for ASEAN.
NOTES
[1] The notion of regional order utilised 
in this paper is devoted to the following 
deﬁ  tion:  a set of rulings and conduct 
prescription norms, to which a regional grouping – composed of states and non-
states actors, is pledging allegiance to.
[2] 1967-1977.
[3] 1978-1987.
[4] 1998-1997.
[5] Like: The Asian Financial Crisis 
(1978), non-conventional security threats – 
such as: SARS,ﬂ  oods,food security issues.
[6] For a long time, Chinese power 
and inﬂ  uence was unopposable.
[7] Dating back to ancient times, 
Vietnam liked to play the role of a small 
state that was not too lenient on accepting 
every major-power dictate. Every other 
Southeast Asian state considered that it had 
more pressing domestic problems to attend 
and second-ranked the issue of property 
claims in South China Sea. For China, 
Southeast Asia per se, as a whole region,   
was a realm of natural Chinese inﬂ  uence, 
where the Middle Kingdome established 
tributary relations with its southernmost 
neighbours who had the most to suffer from 
the global implications of Imperial China; 
The strong liaison between China and the 
subordinate actors from Southeast Asia 
was interrupted throughout the periods of 
European Colonialism, the horid period 
of the Japanese Occupation, and, then, 
the re-enactment of the European Neo-
Colonialism. For Vietnam, The South China 
Sea synthentised a long-nurtured ambition 
for regional hegemony and a power-item 
that was created, through geographical 
juxtaposition and fated to be Vietnamese. 
[8] Compiled with the fact that the 
South China Sea holds a important 
strategic position for the prosperity and 
peace of the wider Asia-Paciﬁ  c region – 
as suggested by: Stirring Up the South 
China Sea, Asia Report, International 
Crisis Group, 23rd of April 2012.
[9] The year instilled a trend for Chinese 
cartographers to include the ”U”-shaped 
line in all the oﬁ  cial maps produced to date.
[10] United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982), Agreement 
relating to the implementation of Part XI 
of the Convention, retrieved from:http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.
htm, accession date: 13th of June 2013,
accession time: 16:38 p.m.
[11] According to article 76, Part VI – 
Continental Shelf, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982):
” The continental shelf of a coastal State 
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its 
territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or 
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured where 
the outer edge of the continental margin 
does not extend up to that distance”.
[12] United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982), Section 1 – 
Article 1, Section 2 – Article 3, retrieved 
from:http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
closindx.htm, accession date: 13th of 
June 2013, accession time: 16:58 p.m.
[13] United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982), Article 76 –
Deﬁ   nition of the continental shelf,
retrieved from:http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
closindx.htm,accession date: 13th of June 
2013, accession time: 17:23 p.m.
[14] During the ASEAN Regional 
Forum Summit in July 2010, US 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton over-
stressed the importance of providing 
multilateral frameworks for multilateral 
disputes and reiterated US policy 
objective towards Asia-Paciﬁ  c  region, 
of maintaing commercial sea lanes 
open in the South China Sea (a forceful 
mentioning for what US considers to be 
of vital interest for its foreign policy in the 
region). It was US’s way to elucidate the 
fact that the South China Sea belongs to 
the category of collective commons and 
not to a unilateral territorial accreage.
[15] The Philippines protested against 
Vietnam and Malaysia’s requests to 
explore an area located at a distance of 
200 nautical miles off their exclusive 
economic zones in the South China Sea. 
The Philippines’ contestations were 
rapidly joined by the Chinese ones. From 
all the claimant states, the clearest and 
the less ambiguous claims are the ones 
made by Vietnam and Malaysia.
[16] As mentioned by the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi during the 17th reunion 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2011.[17] As informed by: Stirring Up the 
South China Sea, Asia Report, International 
Crisis Group, 23rd of April 2012.
[18] Goldstein Lyle (2011), Chinese
Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: 
An abundance of Noise and Smoke, 
bu little ﬁ  re, Journal of Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 33.3, pages:320-347.
[19] As informed by: Stirring Up the 
South China Sea, Asia Report, International 
Crisis Group, 23rd of April 2012.
[20] Fixing energy prices is a 
government’s preorgative.
[21] Malaysia granted exploration 
rights to the Murphy Oil Company and 
Brunei granted exploration rights to 
Royal Dutch Shell and Total.
[22] With other geographique 
counterparts, China’s actions generated 
immediate and forestalling reactions: in Sino-
Indian relations, in China-Tibet relations or in 
the Sino-Soviet relations.
[23] As suggested by: Marvin C. Ott (2011), 
Deep Danger : Competing Claims in the South 
China Sea, China and East Asia, September 
2011,  Volume 110, Issue: 737, page 236.
[24] The ASEAN Declaration,
Bangkok, 8 August 1967, Preamble.
[25] Conversation with Singaporean 
ofﬁ   cer, Singapore, 1 June 2011, as 
presented in: Holslag Jonathan (2012), 
Making Waves: China and Maritime 
Security in Asia, Asia Paper, Voulme 6, 
Issue 3, 24th of May 2012, ISSN:2034 
– 5364, The Brussels Institute for 
Contemporary China Studies.
[26]Bureau of Fisheries Administration,
China Marine Surveillance, Local
Governments, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Energy Companies, China
Coast Guard, The China Customs Anti-
Smuggling Bureau, National Tourism 
Administration, Environment Ministry.
[27] An economic situation about 
which China can currently boast , without 
fear of receiving patulent sneers.
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